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Abstract: 
In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal 
benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored.  If it is too costly for one type 
of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can hope 
to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type.  For cases of 
small asymmetry of information, the principal can implement the first best contract.  For more 
serious asymmetries of information, the first best is not implementable.  Then the low type may 
be required to overproduce, which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best 
contracting.  We also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of 
their use. 
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1. Introduction 
  In a principal agent problem under adverse selection, a principal can often find many 
performance measures to screen an agent and provide incentive.  If the agent knows the 
variables that are being monitored, an agent of one type can obtain rent by mimicking the 
contractual obligation of another (inferior) type.  In what has been touted as the biggest 
accounting fraud ever ($19 billion), the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) has 
recently investigated a company called CUC International.  It is alleged that the company 
fooled auditors from Ernst and Young by faking the numbers of some of its subsidiaries.  “The 
S.E.C. says that the fraud was easier to pull off because CUC officials knew which subsidiaries 
would be audited, and therefore hid the most obvious frauds in subsidiaries that they knew the 
auditors would not look at.” (New York Times, June 16, 2000).  
  It is standard in the literature to assume that the principal announces ex ante which 
performance measures will be used.
1  In this paper, we show that the principal could gain by 
choosing ex post which variables will be monitored.  If it is too costly for one type of agent to 
mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can hope to catch 
the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type.   
There are many examples where different measures of performance can be used to 
address an agency problem under adverse selection.  Revisiting the standard taxation model of 
Mirrlees (1971), Maskin and Riley (1985) point out that a tax authority can use various 
instruments, such as input and output, to derive the optimal tax scheme. In regulation theory, 
the optimal scheme for a monopolist can also be based on various signals such as input, output, 
costs, etc. (Caillaud et al. (1988)).  An important issue in pollution control is the choice 
between emission taxes and taxes on other factors of production that are correlated with 
emissions (see Besanko (1994), Lewis (1996), Schmutzler and Goulder, (1997)).  The tax 
authority must therefore choose between monitoring emission directly or, alternatively, 
monitoring the pollution abatement technologies (e.g. end-of-pipe technology) installed by the 
polluting firm. 
                                                 
1 See for example, Baron and Myerson (1982), Sappington (1983), and Laffont and Tirole (1993).   2 
Analyses of multiple performance measures also appear in fields other than public 
economics.  Lafontaine and Slade (1996, 1998) argue that, in most manufacturer-retailer 
relationships including franchising, the manufacturer can monitor the retailer through sales data 
or through more direct signals of effort, e.g., by tasting the food quality, assessing the 
cleanliness of the unit or by determining work hours.  In a similar vein, Anderson and Oliver 
(1987) distinguish between behavior-based compensation and outcome-based compensation.  
In labor economics, the literature on piece-rate vs. wage-rate is another illustration of the 
availability of multiple signals (see Matutes and Régibeau (1994) for a recent contribution).
2  
Even when the principal receives several signals, if mimicking is costless, the agent 
simply mimics every possible performance measure so that misrepresentation is never detected.  
Therefore, the principal may not be able to improve the contract by increasing the number of 
signals in this case.  However, if mimicking is costly, then increasing the potential number of 
signals raises the agent's cost of misrepresenting his type.  This would necessarily help the 
principal if signals were free to observe.
3  Since performance measures are typically costly to 
obtain, increasing the number of signals is costly to the principal.
4  However, this is based on 
the implicit assumption that all the signals announced ex ante are indeed monitored eventually.  
Under ex post monitoring, the principal announces a large number of variables ex ante, but 
only decides ex post which ones he will actually monitor.  This gives the principal the option of 
monitoring only a subset of the variables and save on monitoring cost while using the incentive 
power of a large number of variables.  
We want to emphasize that the principal may collect or create an access to a large 
amount of data, even if verifying all of them is too costly.  For income tax returns, the tax code 
                                                 
2 There is also a vast literature on agricultural contracts where wage contracts are input (labor hours) based, and 
sharecropping is output based.  See Singh (1989). 
3 See Holmström (1979) in the context of moral hazard and Rochet and Stole (2000) in the context of 
multidimensional screening. 
4 While more information is typically better, the principal might not use all the available variables.  The reason 
could be that these variables are costly to observe or simply that it is too costly to make all of them verifiable.  
Such an instance would be common when the output has a quality component, and an expert witness has to 
convince a third party of the true value of the quality parameter. This same assumption is at the root of the 
incomplete contract literature (see Hart (1995)).  Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) also show that observing more 
than one variable is not necessarily better when renegotiation is allowed after one variable has been revealed and 
before the other one is revealed.  Crémer (1995) is another example of such an effect of revealing information too 
early in a repeated relationship.   3 
requires taxpayers to report many items that can be crosschecked if the IRS wants to do so.
5 In 
life insurance contracts, individuals are asked to answer a large number of questions regarding 
their health.  For compliance with the chemical weapons treaty, participating countries have to 
make very detailed announcements regarding production plans of every chemical plant in the 
country.
6  Similarly, immigration officials ask a long list of questions when foreigners apply for 
a US visa.  In each of these examples, what is important is that the principal reserves the right 
to decide ex post which pieces of information to verify.   
If the number of variables announced ex ante is large, mimicking every performance 
measure may become too costly for the agent.  As a consequence, the agent trying to mimic 
another type has to guess which variables will actually be monitored. If he guesses incorrectly 
the agent will be caught on the wrong foot and penalized since his true type will then be 
revealed.  This threat of a penalty reduces information rent, and for small cases of asymmetry 
of information, the principal can implement the first best contract.
7  
Our analysis may have important empirical implications in that actual rent in real world 
contracts may be much less than what would be inferred from a model based on one monitoring 
variable.  In reality, organizations have access to multiple monitoring variables even though 
explicit incentives may primarily be based on one variable.  Therefore the scope for 
misrepresentation may be quite limited. In their survey paper, Andreoni et al. (1998, p.821) 
claim that the IRS’s use of “informational reporting,” which requires reports on multiple items 
in tax returns, could partly explain why compliance levels have been so high even though 
penalties and probabilities of auditing are relatively low.  Our results suggest policy guidelines 
as they establish the notion that the access to a menu of variables implies more efficient 
contracts than if only one variable was available.   
The choice between monitoring variables has attracted attention in the recent literature 
on incentive problems due to hidden information.  Maskin and Riley (1985) introduce the 
problem of input versus output monitoring in this framework, and show that output monitoring 
                                                 
5 Bruce (1998, p.472) presents a nice example where the IRS caught pizza parlors committing tax fraud.  The IRS 
auditors showed inconsistencies in the reports of input (flour) and output (sales). 
6 See the web site http://www.opcw.nl/ for more details on the treaty. 
7 In section 2, we contrast our approach with the traditional auditing model after presenting our model.   4 
is better.
8  In a similar vein, Lewis and Sappington (1995), consider the case of pollution 
control, and ask if monitoring pollution or monitoring abatement equipment is more efficient.  
Khalil and Lawarrée (1995) extend the work of Maskin and Riley, and show that the choice of 
the monitoring instrument depends on whether the principal or the agent collects the output.  
Barzel (1997) studies a similar problem in the context of moral hazard.  In a recent paper, 
Bontems and Bourgeon (1999) show that even the choice of the monitoring instrument can be 
used as a screening device.  The principal lets the agent choose the instrument.  They show that 
some types may choose input while others may choose output monitoring, and in some cases 
even the first best efforts can be implemented.  However, this literature assumes that the agent 
knows the variable to be monitored before he acts, whereas we let the principal choose this 
variable after the productive action has occurred.  The literature on multi dimensional screening 
(see Rochet and Stole (2000) and references therein) is also related.  Whereas this literature 
assumes that signals are observed for free, we assume that it is costly to monitor signals.   
Indeed, our main point is that when signals are costly, the principal can save on monitoring cost 
by only observing a subset of signals while deriving benefit from all of them.  
To illustrate our ideas, we use a model similar to Maskin and Riley (1985) where the 
principal can monitor either input or output.  In addition to the result of first best contract for 
cases of small asymmetry of information, we find that the principal may ask a low type agent to 
over-produce as opposed to the traditional under-production result.  Also, we obtain a ranking 
of instruments even when input and output monitoring are equally costly and equally accurate: 
the principal will monitor input more often. 
The paper is organized as follows.  We introduce the model in section 2.  Two 
benchmark contracts are presented in section 3: the full information contract, and the contract 
under ex ante choice of monitoring.  Our main results are presented in section 4, while we 






                                                 
8 For an earlier treatment, see Wittman (1977).   5 
2. The Model 
A risk neutral principal hires a risk neutral agent to work for him.  The agent’s input e ≥ 
0 along with his productivity parameter θ determines output X=α(e,θ), with α(0, θ) ≥ 0, αe > 0, 
α
θ > 0, αee ≤ 0, αeθ ≥ 0, lim ( , )
θ αθ
→∞ =∞ e e .  While we refer below to input e as effort, it could also 
include non-effort related decisions such as the types of input purchased or the end of pipe 
pollution control technology adopted or the marketing strategies selected.  Effort cost is 
inversely related to productivity.
9  The cost of effort for type θ is given by the function ψ(e,θ), 
with  ψe  > 0, ψee  > 0, ψθ  < 0, ψeθ  < 0, ψ(0,θ)  = 0 , lim ( , )
e e e
→∞ =∞ ψθ , lim ( , )
e e e
→ =
0 0 ψθ , 
lim ( , ) lim ( , )
θθ ψθ ψ θ
→∞ →∞ == ee e 0.   
For simplicity, we assume that productivity can be either high (θ2) or low (θ1), 
θθ 21 0 >> .
10  The parameter θ is private information of the agent.  The principal’s subjective 
probability that θθ = 1 is q.  We assume that it is optimal for the principal to employ either type 
of agent.  This implies that q is not too small given the ratio θ2/θ1. 
A contract is a six-tuple {e1, e2, t1, t2, ω1, ω2}, where ωi is the probability of output 
monitoring when the agent announces that he is of type i and ti is the corresponding transfer.  
Note that the contract also implicitly specifies output levels for each type.  For instance, if type 
θ1 is supposed to put in effort e1 in exchange for t1, then the output implied by the contract is: 
X1=α(e1, θ1).  The principal can either monitor the input (e) or the output (X).  Monitoring is 
perfect but publicly reveals only the variable that is monitored, e.g., if output is monitored, X is 
perfectly known but not e nor θ.  This leaves room for one type to mimic the other.  If X1 is 
observed, it cannot be ruled out that the high type has mimicked the low type.  If e1 is observed, 
it is not known whether output is  Xe X => αθ (,) 12 1 .  Even though the principal collects the 
output, we assume that, under input monitoring, he cannot observe output or make it verifiable.  
There are many examples where output has features, such as quality, that are difficult to 
                                                 
9 The previously discussed paper by Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) shows that the opposite assumption leads to 
the introduction of countervailing incentives. 
10 Assumptions made above regarding the functions α(.) and ψ(.) have obvious counterparts for this discrete 
framework.   6 
observe even though the beneficiary of the output is clear.  When controlling pollution, the 
EPA, representing citizens, “consumes pollution” but does not observe its level unless it 
monitors it (see Swierzbinski (1994)).  Healthcare authorities, like Medicare, contract with 
healthcare providers, but the benefit of treatment accrues to patients and is typically not 
observed by the authorities (see Chalkley and Malcomson (1999)).  It is difficult to evaluate the 
work of an auto mechanic, and the military may never learn the efficacy of weapons in a 
nuclear war.
11 
Differentials in cost and precision between input and output monitoring have 
straightforward consequences in our model.  The principal would always be biased towards the 
cheaper and more precise monitoring instrument.  To focus on a ranking of instruments based 
only upon incentives, we therefore assume that input and output monitoring are equally costly 
and equally precise.  Monitoring is error free and it costs C to monitor either input or output.  A 
more critical assumption is that it is not feasible to monitor both input and output.  This 
assumption captures the fact that in general it is too costly for the principal to monitor every 
possible performance measure.  In our model, if both input and output were observed, the first 
best (minus 2C) would always be reached.  We could also have allowed the principal to choose 
to observe neither input nor output.  If nothing was observed, the transfer would be based only 
on the agent’s announcement and the expected cost of monitoring would drop below C.
12  
We assume that the principal can commit to the probability of monitoring as part of the 
contract.  This assumption turns out to be innocuous in our model since we assume that the 
principal must monitor either input or output, which can be observed with equal precision and 
accuracy.  More generally, the commitment assumption is restrictive, but is used frequently in 
models with monitoring.  It is typically justified using informal arguments from repeated games 
or delegation games.  Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) model IRS audits to show that if the 
public can observe some aggregate variables like the IRS budget, aggregate costs and fines 
collected, then the government can attain the full commitment outcome even if it cannot control 
                                                 
11 See Lewis-Sappington (1991), Lawarrée-Van Audenrode (1996) or Strausz (1997) for further examples. 
12 In tax-compliance models (e.g. Mookherjee and Png’s (1989)) tax is only based on reported income unless there 
is an audit.  In Swierzbinski’s (1994) model of pollution control, the regulatory policy is based on the announced 
type unless the level of pollution is monitored.  But in each case the principal announces ex ante the variable to be 
monitored.    7 
audit probabilities directly.
13  In a model without commitment to the monitoring probability, 
the equilibrium would be in mixed strategies (see for example Khalil (1997)), and the optimal 
contract would be more complex to characterize.  Since our goal was to demonstrate simply the 
benefit of basing the contract on multiple signals while monitoring only a subset, we chose the 
simpler model with commitment. 
The principal collects the output and compensates the agent with a transfer t.  The agent 
receives the transfer t, but bears the cost  ψ(e,θ).  The agent knows his productivity before 
signing the contract.  Therefore he must receive his reservation utility (normalized to zero) in 
any state of the world.  The agent is asked to announce his type after accepting the contract.  If 
the monitored signal does not correspond to the announcement, shirking is detected and the 
agent does not receive any transfer.  The penalty for shirking is therefore the uncompensated 
cost of effort
14.  A more stringent penalty could also be considered: besides losing his transfer 
the agent may be required to suffer an additional fine F > 0.  For now, we assume that F = 0, 






We have presented a model in which the principal can hope to catch the agent on the 
wrong foot and penalize him by choosing the monitoring variables ex post.  The agent could 
not be penalized in a model of ex ante choice or if mimicking is costless.  With ex ante choice, 
the agent knows which variables to mimic; with costless mimicking, the agent would mimic 
every variable.  In either case, misrepresentation cannot be detected; it can only be deterred by 
giving rent, and there are no penalties on or off the equilibrium path.  The monopoly regulation 
                                                 
13 One could interpret the formula for computing DIF scores (see Andreoni et al. (1998)) as an attempt at 
coordinating actions of IRS auditors, and thus a form of commitment to auditing.  Even though the formula is 
secret, it presumably can be inferred over time. 




Nature chooses θ. 




Agent chooses e. 
Output is realized. 
ωi is realized. 
Monitoring occurs. 
Transfers are paid.   8 
model of Baron and Myerson (1982) is an example with ex ante choice and costless mimicking.  
Sappington (1983) is another example of ex ante choice and costless mimicking, but with 
multiple signals.  The model of input versus output monitoring used here is due to Maskin and 
Riley (1985), and it provides a clean way to capture the impossibility of mimicking every 
variable in a simple technology: when one type of agent mimics another, he can mimic another 
type's input or output but not both.  In section 5, we extend our model to allow the agent to 
mimic every variable by introducing falsification cost. 
Our main ideas would generalize to a model with more than two types.  Consider for 
instance a continuum of types.  The agent must still announce his type and misrepresentation 
will be detected in the same fashion.  The only difference is that, when misrepresentation is 
detected, the monitored variable could correspond to the level of another existing type.
15  
However, the agent still gets caught since the monitored variable does not correspond to the 
equilibrium value of the announced type. 
In our model, efficiency of the optimal contract is enhanced by off-the-equilibrium path 
penalties.  This aspect of our model is similar to auditing models where the principal can 
commit to audit probabilities.  However, our model differs from the traditional auditing 
model.
16  In these models, one variable, say output, is always observed, and therefore a high 
type may shirk by producing the output level of a low type.  In order to discover shirking, the 
principal has to observe a second variable (input), which is the outcome of an audit.  In our 
model, the principal has access to two variables, but ultimately observes only one variable.  If 
the principal randomizes between the potential monitoring variables, a shirking agent faces a 
positive probability of penalty even if only one variable is observed.  Thus monitoring cost may 
be lower than under auditing since only one variable has to be monitored in equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
15 In our model with two types, when the high type agent mimics the input of the low type he produces an output 
higher than the equilibrium output of the low type and lower than the equilibrium output of the high type. 
16 See for example, Baron and Besanko (1984) or Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) for auditing models with 
commitment, and Khalil (1997) for the case without commitment.  Without commitment, there may be penalties in 
equilibrium.   9 
3. The first best contract, and the contract under ex ante choice of 
monitoring  
If the agent's type is publicly observable, the principal's problem is to choose efforts and 
transfers for each type of agent to maximize expected profit: 
q [α(e1, θ1) -t1]+(1-q) [α(e2, θ2)-t2] 
subject to the individual rationality constraints of the two types: 
(IR1)   t1 - ψ(e1,θ1) ≥ 0, 
(IR2)   t2 - ψ(e2,θ2) ≥ 0. 
The solution is the first best contract, where marginal benefit of effort equals marginal cost, and 
there is no rent.  For i= 1, 2,  
αe(ei





*, θi) . 
Next, we examine the case where the agent's type is private information and the 
principal commits to monitor a particular variable as part of the contract (that is, ωi = 0 or 1).  
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On the other hand, under output monitoring, payments are based on observed output, 
and the incentive compatibility constraints now become:  
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where ẽ1 and ẽ2 satisfy α(ẽ1,θ2) = α(e1,θ1) and α(ẽ2,θ1)=α(e2,θ2).  Indeed, when mimicking the 
low type, the high type agent has to produce X1 and exert an effort ẽ1 smaller than e1.  The low 
type mimicking the high type must exert an effort ẽ2 higher than e2.    10 
The principal's problem is to maximize expected profit subject to the individual 
rationality constraints, and the relevant incentive compatibility constraints given the monitoring 
scheme.  In Khalil-Lawarrée (1995), we show that input monitoring yields higher profit to the 
principal in this model.  Intuitively, it is because the agent receives rent from two sources under 
output monitoring and from only one source under input monitoring. The rents for the high type 
agent under input and output monitoring are respectively,  
 Rent
I = ψ(e1, θ1) - ψ(e1, θ2) , 
 Rent
O = ψ(e1, θ1) - ψ(ẽ1, θ2) . 
The expression for Rent
O shows that the high type agent receives a rent because (i) he 
can exert a lower level of effort (ẽ1 < e1) and (ii) he has a lower cost of effort.  Under input 
monitoring, the agent only commands a rent from a lower cost of effort.  The other results are 
standard: the high type produces efficiently; the low type under-produces and his effort is 
inversely related to θ2/θ1; the low type does not earn rent.  
 
 
4. Ex post choice of monitoring 
We now return to the case where the principal does not have to decide to exclusively monitor 
input or output before the effort is taken.  The principal can commit to a probability of output 
monitoring  ωi  ∈ [0, 1].  The principal's problem is to choose a contract that solves the 
following problem (P): 
Max q[α(e1,θ1 ) - t1 ] + (1-q) [α(e2,θ2 ) - t2 ] - C 
s.t. 
(IC2)  t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 ) ≥ max {ω1 t1 - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ), (1-ω1 ) t1 - ψ(e1,θ2 )}, 
(IC1)  t1 - ψ(e1,θ1 ) ≥ max {ω2 t2 - ψ(ẽ2,θ1 ), (1-ω2 ) t2 - ψ(e2,θ1 )}, 
(IR2)   t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 ) ≥ 0, 
(IR1)  t1 - ψ(e1,θ1 ) ≥ 0. 
While the individual rationality constraints are standard, the incentive compatibility 
constraints require elaboration.  We explain (IC2) only since (IC1) is analogous.  A high type   11 
agent can claim to be a low type either by mimicking input, i.e., exerting e1, or by mimicking 
output, i.e., exerting ẽ1.  If he chooses e1, he only receives t1 if input is monitored, which occurs 
with probability (1-ω1), while he bears the cost ψ(e1, θ2 ) for certain.  If he chooses ẽ1, he will 
only receive t1 with probability ω1, while bearing the smaller cost ψ(ẽ1, θ2 ).  The contract must 
ensure that the agent has no incentive to misrepresent his type under either option.  Since the 
high type agent cannot simultaneously mimic both input and output of the low type, he faces a 
penalty with a positive probability as long as monitoring is random. 
As a preliminary step, we simplify the problem (P).  As is typical in these types of 
models, the low type will not want to claim to be of high type in equilibrium.  Therefore, we 
now assume that the constraint (IC1) is not binding in equilibrium, but this can be verified to be 
true later for appropriately chosen ω2.  We will clarify the choice of ω2 in footnote 17 when 
discussing lemma 2.  Then (IR1) is binding since t1 can be lowered without violating any 
constraints.  We replace t1 by ψ(e1,θ1 ) in the principal's problem and focus now on (IC2) which 
is rewritten as 
(IC
∗
2)  t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 ) ≥ max {ω1 ψ(e1,θ1 )  - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ), (1-ω1 ) ψ(e1,θ1 ) - ψ(e1,θ2 )}, 
The high type may want to claim to be a low type so that he is compensated for 
ψ(e1,θ1), whereas he has actually incurred only ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) or ψ(e1,θ2 ).  This cost differential 
represents the benefit from shirking, and is typically the rent in models with ex ante choice of 
monitoring (see Rent
I and Rent
O in section 3).  In our model, shirking has another, new 
consequence: there may be a penalty due to ex post choice of monitoring, which is the 
uncompensated cost when shirking is detected. In the standard case, there is no penalty since 
shirking cannot be detected; it can only be deterred.  We first show that the principal will 
optimally use this penalty by randomizing between the two instruments. 
Lemma 1. It is optimal to monitor both input and output randomly (0 < ω1 < 1.). 
Proof.  In appendix. 
The intuition is straightforward.  If the principal only does input monitoring (ω1=0), 
then the high type agent must be given a rent since he can mimic the input of the low type agent   12 
without any risk of being detected by the principal.  If ω1 is slightly positive, the shirking agent 
will be detected with positive probability and the resulting penalty implies a lower rent.   
Similarly, if only output monitoring occurs (ω1=1), a shirking high type agent obtains a rent 
from his ability to mimic the output of a low type agent without running the risk of being 
detected while his rent can be reduced if ω1<1.  Therefore, it is never optimal for the principal 
to perform either input or output monitoring exclusively. 
Having established that the principal will randomize, we argue next that, without loss of 
generality, the ω1 will be chosen to equate the two terms on the right hand side (RHS) of the 
constraint (IC2).  First note that in the principal's problem the ω1 only appears on the RHS of 
the incentive constraint (IC2).  On the RHS of (IC2), the first term is increasing and the second 
term is decreasing in ω1.  Thus for any efforts and transfers, the principal can choose ω1 to 
make the RHS as small as possible by equating the two terms.  This implies that ω1 < .5 as 
ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) < ψ(e1,θ2 ) in (IC2).  Mimicking output generates a larger cost differential for the agent 
as he saves on the cost of effort and also on the amount of effort when he mimics the low type.  
Therefore, to lower rent, the optimal ω1 is biased towards input monitoring by setting ω1 < 1/2.   
We have proved the following lemma
17. 
 
Lemma 2.   Without loss of generality, the principal can set  









ee [(, ) ( ~,) ]  <  .5 and it solves  
  ω1 t1  - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) = (1-ω1 ) t1 - ψ(e1,θ2 ). 
 
It can be readily argued, that in our simple model, the optimal ω1 also turns out to be 
sequentially rational.  This is because the agent does not shirk in equilibrium and monitoring 
input or output is equally costly.  Therefore, ex post the principal will have no incentive to 
deviate from his pre-announced choice of ω1 as he has to pay the transfer t1 in either case.  This 
                                                 
17 Just like in the case of (IC2) and ω1, equating the two terms also minimizes the RHS of (IC1) which gives ω2 
without loss of generality.  Note that for some parameter values, it is possible that even if ω2 is 0 or 1, the (IC1) is 
not binding.   13 
would not be the case if the instruments were not equally costly and precise, since then the 
principal would monitor the cheaper variable if he knew the agent was not shirking.  
Remembering that (IR1) is binding, and substituting ω1 from lemma 2, (IC
*
2) can be 
rewritten as  
(IC′2)  t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 )   ≥ .5[ψ(e1,θ1 )  - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) - ψ(e1,θ2 )], 
   ≡ .5 R(e1,θ1,θ2)         ( R e n t )  
When the (IC2) is binding, the RHS gives the agent's rent, which is .5R(e1, θ1, θ2).  
Comparing with the rent expressions in section 3, it is easily seen that the RHS of (IC′2) is 
different from the standard rent under ex ante choice of monitoring.  The RHS of (IC′2) shows 
the benefit of mimicking the low type and saving on cost as well as the expected penalty from 
detection.  In the standard case, there would be no penalty. Our main results will all depend on 
how R(e1,θ1,θ2) changes with the variables.  For example, if increasing e1 increases R(e1,θ1,θ2), 
there will be under-production relative to first best.   
We are now ready to present the simplified problem.  We use the binding IR1 to replace 
t1 and lemma 2 to replace ω1 in problem (P).  Therefore, the principal’s problem is now (SP)  
Max q[α(e1,θ1 ) - ψ(e1,θ1 ) ] + (1-q) [α(e2,θ2 ) - t2 ] - C 
s.t.  
(IC′2)  t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 )   ≥ .5[ψ(e1,θ1 )  - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) - ψ(e1,θ2 )],  
(IR2)   t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 ) ≥ 0.  
Proposition 1: If the two agents are very similar (the ratio θ2/θ1 is close enough to 1), the first 
best contract is implementable. 
Proof.  In appendix. 
Thus we find that the principal may obtain the benefit of two variables when in fact he 
observes only one.  Remember that with ex ante monitoring, both variables had to be observed 
to obtain the first best in this model.  This result can be understood by examining why the high 
type agent cannot command a rent.  As noted earlier, the RHS of IC′2 represents the rent.  It is   14 
the net effect of the gain from mimicking the low type, which is the cost differential minus the 
expected penalty from being detected.  When θ2 is relatively small, the cost differential is small 
but the penalty is strong because the cost of effort for the high type is large.  This penalty 
allows the principal to implement the first best contract.
18  With larger θ2, the cost of (any level 
of) effort falls, weakening the penalty while the cost differential increases.  This is why the first 
best contract is no longer implementable for larger values of θ2/θ1.   
We have just argued that for high values of θ2/θ1, (IC′2) is binding and there will be a 
distortion in e1.  The distortion can be explained by examining how R(e1,θ1,θ2) is affected by 
changes in e1.  Since a higher effort e1 implies a higher cost of effort, and this cost is also the 
penalty for a shirker, the principal can strengthen the penalty by increasing the effort of the low 
type.  We call this the penalty effect of increasing e1 on R(e1,θ1,θ2).  Increasing e1 has an 
undesirable effect for the principal too: it increases the cost differential and therefore makes the 
gain from shirking larger.  We refer to this effect as the traditional effect of increasing e1 on 
R(e1,θ1,θ2).  The relative strength of the two effects explains the distortion in e1.  For instance, 
if the penalty effect is stronger, rent decreases with e1, and the optimal e1 is set above its first 
best level.  The net contribution of the two effects on rent is captured by the derivative of 
R(e1,θ1,θ2) with respect to e1, which we define by Re(e1,θ1,θ2) and is given below:  
















Note the difference with Proposition 1 where the levels of the penalty and cost differential were 
relevant, and here it is the effect of changing e1 on the penalty and the cost differential.   
Without the penalty effect, an increase in e1 would simply increase the cost differential 
and there would be underproduction due to the traditional effect of changing e1.  In a traditional 
input monitoring problem, as in section 3, only two terms appear in the definition of R
I
e 
(e1,θ1,θ2):   
ψθ ψθ ee ee (,) (,) 11 12 − . 
                                                 
18 The profit is not first best because C must be deducted.   15 
Clearly, this expression is positive and under-production always occurs.  Similarly in a 
traditional output monitoring problem, R
O

















Once again, this expression is unambiguously positive and under-production occurs.   
However, when the principal does not announce whether input or output monitoring 
will occur, Re(e1,θ1,θ2) has the form described above and the sign of this expression is 
ambiguous.  In Proposition 2, we state and prove that the penalty effect prevails for relatively 
small values of θ2/θ1, i.e., the net rent of the high type .5R(e1,θ1,θ2) is decreasing in e1 and over-
production occurs.  We provide more intuition about this using an example below. 
Proposition 2. When the first best contract is not implementable, the low type over-produces 
(with respect to the first best effort level) if θ2/θ1 is relatively small and under-produces if θ2/θ1 
is relatively large.  
Proof.  In appendix. 
In addition, if Re(e1,θ1,θ2) is monotonically increasing in θ2, there exists a unique cut-off 
θ  separating regions of under- and over-production.  In the appendix, we derive conditions 
under which Re(e1,θ1,θ2) is monotonically increasing in θ2, and we show that this occurs when 
αee(e,θ) is not too large.  For many functional forms used in the literature such as α(e, θ)=θ + e 
or α(e,θ)=θ.e, we have αee(e, θ)=0, and a unique cut-off θ  is found such that over-production 
occurs for θ2 < θ  and under-production for θ2 > θ .  
An Example: α α α α(e, θ θ θ θ) = e + θ θ θ θ, ψ( ψ( ψ( ψ(e, θ) =  , θ) =  , θ) =  , θ) = e
2/2θ θ θ θ
2, θ θ θ θ1=1, q = .5 
We clarify our analysis further by considering an example with αee(e, θ) = 0, so that Re(e1, θ1, 
θ2) is unambiguously increasing in θ2.  The optimal e1 is graphed for various values of θ2 in 
figure 1.  For θ2 close to θ1, the penalty is larger than the cost differential, and we have the first 
best.  For larger values of θ2, the penalty falls with θ2 and the cost differential rises with the 
difference in productivity.  For θ2 > 1.38θ1, R(e1,θ1,θ2) is positive at the first best e1 and IC′2 is 
violated under the first best contract.  To satisfy IC′2, the principal can increase t2 and give rent   16 
or distort e1 and lower R(e1,θ1,θ2).  Since there is no first order loss from distorting e1 at this 
point, he distorts e1 first.  For further increases in θ2, rent is provided. 
To see why overproduction occurs first (as opposed to underproduction), we have to 
consider how the penalty effect and the traditional effect are influenced by changes in θ2.  For 
small θ2, the penalty effect is larger than the traditional effect and there is overproduction.  
Since the marginal cost falls and the marginal cost differential increases with θ2, the penalty 
effect decreases and the traditional effect increases with θ2.  When the traditional effect 
dominates (for θ2 > 1.5θ1), we finally obtain underproduction.    
At θ2 = 1.38θ1, when the IC2 is violated under the first best incentive scheme, the 
penalty effect is still stronger (Re(e1,θ1,θ2) < 0): an increase in e1 above the first best level 
increases the penalty more than the cost differential and decreases R(e1, θ1, θ2).  This maintains 
the agent’s rent at zero for θ2 above (but close to) 1.38θ1.  As θ2 becomes larger, increasing e1 
keeps rent at zero, but at some point (1.4θ1) this distortion in e1 is too costly, and it is better to 
yield rent.  When rent is provided, the distortion in e1 is reduced.  See figure 1.   17 
 
5. Extensions 
It is interesting to mention what happens if the principal can impose a fine F > 0 besides 
withholding the transfer to the shirking agent.  As expected, if F becomes very large, the 
principal can secure the first best contract.  More importantly, notice that F affects the penalty 
(see proposition 1), but not the penalty effect (see proposition 2).  So as long as the first best is 
not implementable, the result of overproduction survives even if there is an additional penalty 
F. 
Note that if the penalty was transfer independent and only consisted of a fixed fine F, 
no over production would occur in equilibrium.  However, a transfer dependent penalty, as we 
have assumed, by itself does not generate over production
19.  It is the simultaneous presence of 
ex post choice of monitoring and a transfer dependent penalty that lies behind the result of over 
production in our model.  
We can also extend our model to allow the agent to mimic both variables but at some 
cost.  For instance, when he mimics the input, the agent can also at some cost A(.) falsify the 
output.  In our model, A(.) would represent the cost of destroying the extra output (X2-X1).  The 
other option for the agent, i.e., mimicking the output, would lead him to falsify the input.  This 
could be achieved by making observed input unproductive (e.g., employees sitting at the 
computer but playing solitaire).  By analogy we call it the cost of destroying input: B(.). 
We model the two functions as A(X2-X1) and B(X2-X1).  They are assumed to be 
increasing and convex with respect to (X2-X1). 
20  
 
The (IC2) now becomes 
 
(IC2
+) t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 ) ≥  Max { .5[t1 - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) - ψ(e1,θ2 )]; t1 - ψ(e1,θ2 ) – A(.); t1 - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) – B(.)} 
                                                 
19  Khalil (1997) shows that in a standard auditing model with commitment to auditing, but with transfer dependent 
penalty, over production does not occur. 
20 For simplicity we assume that the functions A(.) and B(.) are independent of θ.  An alternative way to model 
mimicking costs can be found in the literature on costly state falsification.  (See Crocker and Morgan (1998), 
Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995) and references therein.)  However, it would complicate the analysis by 
introducing countervailing incentives as in Lewis and Sappington (1989). As long as A(.)and  B(.) are not 
increasing in θ, countervailing incentives would not be present.   18 
The agent has now four options besides telling the truth: he can mimic (i) input or (ii) 
output as before; (iii) he can mimic input and falsify output; (iv) he can mimic output and 
falsify input.   
If A(.) and B(.) are so large that the second and third terms of the RHS of (IC2
+
 ) are 
negative, our model applies unchanged.  When it is not the case, over production can still 
occur.  Indeed, the functions A(.) and B(.) can play a role similar to the penalty term in (IC′2).  
Therefore the RHS of (IC2
+) has once again three terms vs. two in the ex ante model of 
monitoring.  Consider, for example, the situation where the agent mimics the input and falsifies 
the output.  The (IC2) is now: 
t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 )   ≥   t1 - ψ(e1,θ2 ) – A(X2-X1) 
With (IR1) binding, the rent R is equal to ψ(e1,θ1)−ψ(e1,θ2)−Α(X2− X1) and its derivative 
with respect to e is Re= ψe(e1,θ1) − ψe(e1,θ2) − Α′(.)[αe(e1,θ2)-αe(e1,θ1)].  The objective function 
can be written as q[α(e1,θ1)-ψ(e1,θ1)] + (1-q) [α(e2,θ2)-ψ(e2,θ2) – R].  According to the first 
order conditions, e2=e2
FB and e1 is such that q[αe(e1,θ1) – ψe(e1,θ1)] - (1-q) Re = 0.  So if Re < 0 
we have over-production.   
As before, ψe(e1,θ1) − ψe(e1,θ2) > 0 , and once again over-production can arise because 
{−Α′(.) [αe(e1,θ2)-αe(e1,θ1)]} < 0., i.e., Re can be negative.  So what is crucial to get over-
production is the existence of another term in Re (the derivative of the rent) that has a negative 
sign.  Ex post monitoring produces this extra term even when we explicitly model falsification 
costs. 
Whether we continue to obtain the result that the first best is achieved for small 
asymmetry of information depends on the properties of the specific falsification cost function 
chosen.  For instance, if there are fixed costs involved in falsification, the first best will still be 
reached for small asymmetry of information since the falsification cost does not disappear as 
the asymmetry of information reduces.   
Therefore, our results generalize to the case where the agent can mimic all variables.  
Also, as the number of potential signals increase, so does falsification cost, and the principal 
benefits.   19 
 
6. Conclusions  
When multiple screening variables are available, we show that the principal can use the agent's 
fear of getting caught on the wrong foot by choosing the monitoring variable ex post.  If the 
agent’s types are similar (if θ2/θ1 is small in our model), this strategy of the principal has strong 
incentive effects: it yields the first best.  For more serious situations of asymmetry (larger 
θ2/θ1), the first best is no longer implementable.  We characterize the optimal contract and 
show that the traditional result of second best contracting no longer holds.  Indeed, the principal 
might find it desirable to require the low type to overproduce.   
For hidden information problems, our analysis provides a ranking of signals in terms of 
the likelihood of their use as monitoring instruments.  Aside from issues of cost and accuracy, 
the probability of use is driven by the rent generated.  In a contract with ex ante choice of 
instrument, if the agent can command more rent under one signal, then that variable will be 
monitored less often under ex post choice of instrument.  We illustrate this by showing how 
input monitoring is used more frequently than output monitoring since there is more rent under 
output monitoring under the ex ante contract. 
In real world applications, it may not be possible for the principal to hide for long the 
variable to be monitored.  This is true, for example, if the chosen variable must be monitored as 
soon as the contract takes effect and this cannot be hidden.  However, there are many cases 
where the evaluation takes place once the agent has performed his contractual obligations (see 
the introduction for examples),
21 and our analysis becomes relevant.  
In many contractual relationships, the principal has the possibility to observe several 
variables but seems to observe only one of them most of the time.  Our model stressed the role 
of rent, but we need to remember that we have abstracted from differences in cost or accuracy 
between the monitoring instruments.  Often, a particular monitoring instrument reveals itself as 
more efficient.
22  The principal should therefore use that instrument more often.  However, our 
model shows that having the opportunity to monitor an alternative variable has important 
                                                 
21 This does not preclude early monitoring as long as the agent is not aware of it. 
22 This could be because it is more accurate and/or less expensive.   20 
incentive effects.  If this alternative variable is much less accurate and/or much more costly, the 
principal should use it with a very small, but positive probability.  Also, in reality, different 
variables have different mimicking costs, which we have abstracted from.  The principal will 
take these costs into account too when determining the frequency of use of monitoring 
instruments.  But our main message will survive, as the principal will benefit from an increase 
in the dimensionality of the admissible signaling space while monitoring only a subset of 
signals.   21 
Appendix 
 
Proof of lemma 1 
Replacing (IC
*
2) in the principal's problem (P), we see that the constraint (IC
*
2) is binding if ω1 
∈ {0, 1}.  If ω1 = 0, the principal commits to monitor input, and the high-type's rent, which is t2 
- ψ(e2, θ2), equals ψ(e1,θ1 ) - ψ(e1,θ2 ) > 0.  By choosing an ω1 slightly positive, the principal 
can make (IC
*
2) slack and decrease t2.  A similar argument can be made for decreasing ω1 from 
ω1 = 1.    
Proof of Proposition 1 
We show that there exists a cut-off θ  > 0, such that if θ2/θ1 < θ then (IC′2) is slack under the 
first best contract and the first best contract is implementable, and that if θ2/θ1 > θ then IC′2 is 
binding and the first best contract is not implementable. 
If R(e1
*,θ1, θ2) is negative, IC′2 is slack under the first best contract.  By the definition of 
α(e, θ), ~(,,)





→ = ee e.  Hence,  
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and the first best is no longer implementable for θ2 high enough.   
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Proof of proposition 2 
The Lagrangian is:  
 L  = q[α(e1,θ1 ) - ψ(e1,θ1 )] + (1-q) [α(e2,θ2) - t2 ] - C   22 
+ λ1[ t2 - ψ(e2,θ2 ) -.5{ψ(e1,θ1 )  - ψ(ẽ1,θ2 ) - ψ(e1,θ2 )}] + λ2 [t2 - ψ(e2, θ2)]. 
Consider the case where IC′2 is binding, i.e., λ1> 0.  It is easily checked that the optimal e1 must 
satisfy 
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12 .  
If Re(e1, θ1, θ2)  is positive (resp. negative), then under-production (resp. over-production) will 
result.  The existence of a solution is demonstrated using an example in section 4, and here it is 
sufficient to show that for θ2 close to θ1, Re(e1, θ1, θ2) < 0 and for large θ2, Re(e1, θ1, θ2) > 0. 
l i m (,,) (,)
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From the definitions of ψ(e, θ) and ẽ1(e1, θ1, θ2), we know that both ψe(e1, θ2) and  ẽ1(e1, θ1, 














 ≤ 0.  One can check that this occurs when αee(e,θ) is not too large.  A sufficient 
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Figure 1: Effort of the Low Type as a Function of θ θ θ θ2/θ θ θ θ1 
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